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If you look at anybody’s typical list of emotions, you won’t see pains and pleasures among 
them.  Indeed, even among the atypical emotions that people working on emotions 
regularly cite, pains and pleasures show up only rarely.  And yet, very few people will fail 
to acknowledge the critical, or perhaps the essential, role pains and pleasures play in our 
emotional lives.  This chapter will explain the sense in which pains and pleasures are 
elementary forms of emotions.  
 Let’s first distinguish pain and pleasure experiences, properly so-called, from their 
sources — typically, the physical objects, events, activities, etc., that cause such 
experiences.  Smelling a rose is a pleasure, getting pricked by a rose bush thorn a pain — 
it is said.  But it is primarily the experiences generated by these events that are said to be 
pleasant or painful.  These experiences are mental events or episodes caused by various 
physical stimuli.  It is harmless, in fact sometimes quite appropriate, to extend the terms 
to refer to such stimuli in most ordinary contexts as causes of such experiences.  But here 
we will focus on pains and pleasures as experiences.  As experiences, they are presumed 




In ordinary parlance, pain experiences are sometimes divided into what may intuitively be 
called ‘sensory’ and ‘emotional’ pains (for example, pains due to a paper cut or sprained 
ankle versus intense grief or frustration — this distinction is sometimes marked as 
‘physical’ versus ‘psychological’ pain).  Sensory pains are those experiences that involve 
the (normal or abnormal) activity of nociceptive mechanisms in the nervous system, 
whereas emotional “pains” don't involve such activity — although sensory and emotional 
pains seem to share the affective-motivational mechanisms (see below; Eisenberger 
2012).  The practice of calling negatively valenced intense non-sensory experiences 'pains' 
are generally avoided in pain science and clinical settings, and I will follow this practice 
                                                 
1 Positive and negative affect as occurs in pain and pleasure experiences need not be conscious.  For the 
purposes of this chapter, I’ll have conscious experiences in mind in what follows except when it matters — 
see below, and Chapter ?? this volume. 
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and concentrate on sensory pains.2  The International Association for the Study of Pain 
(IASP) defines 'pain' as follows: 
 
IASP Definition of ‘pain’:  
Unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with potential or actual 
tissue damage, or described in terms of such damage. (IASP, 1979/2011) 
 
Although there have been minor controversies about proper wording and the apparent 
appeal to linguistic description, this definition has been well received and widely 
accepted.3  It captures all the major components of pains. 
 
Sensory.  Despite some controversy over the degree of its specificity (Perl 2011, Woolf & 
Ma 2007, Basbaum 2011), it has been generally accepted that there is a somewhat 
specialized nociceptive input system from the bodily periphery (nociceptors) to the 
central brain mechanisms that process somatosensory information about a spectrum of 
noxious stimuli (mechanical, chemical, thermal) that might cause actual or potential 
tissue damage.  This system and the aspect of the pain experience it subserves is 
identified with the sensory-discriminative component of sensory pain which encodes 
various sensory qualities, intensity, bodily location and temporal characteristics of 
noxious stimuli.  This system is, to some extent, comparable to other sensory input 
systems we have such as visual, auditory, gustatory, olfactory and various tactile sensory 
submodalities.  The job of sensory systems is to transduce energy forms impinging on 
bodily surfaces (receptors) and thereby provide information about a range of physical 
parameters (stimuli) in the environment of the organism to the central brain mechanisms 
for further processing.  We will use ‘sensory’ in this relatively technical sense, and 
‘sensation’ to refer to the immediate experiential output of sensory systems registering 
the detection of relevant range of stimulus features proprietary to specific modalities.4  
 
                                                 
2 Examples of 'emotional pains' are typical negative emotions (when intense) such as grief, sadness, dread, 
anxiety, embarrassment, jealousy, shame, feelings of social exclusion, romantic loss, etc.  So, obviously, 
emotional pains are paradigm cases of emotions.  See Corns (2015) for a fairly persuasive argument that the 
so-called social pain (and the like) is not pain properly speaking — it’s a “pain” only by courtesy of sharing 
the affective-motivational aspect of pain experiences and its underlying mechanisms (see also Eisenberger 
2012) — see below. 
3 For a survey of these criticisms and defence of the IASP definition in its historical context, see Aydede 
(2017).  Wright (2011) is also very useful. 
4 Sensory pains are sometimes divided into nociceptive, neuropathic, nociplastic pains — all can be chronic 
(see IASP 2011, Kosek et al 2016).  Melzack and Wall’s classic 1996 book, The Challenge of Pain, is still good 
as an entry to the overall organization of the sensory-discriminative aspect of pain. 
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Unpleasant.  Sensory pain experiences normally have also an affective-motivational 
component interfaced with their (nociception-based) sensory-discriminative component.5 
This component gives the normal sensory pain experiences their negative affective (or, 
hedonic) tone or character.  It’s in virtue of this component that pains are said to be 
unpleasant, hurtful, awful, agonizing, bad, or simply, ‘painful’.  The job of the affective-
motivational component is to move the organism to deal with the unfolding (actual or 
potential) noxious events happening in or around the tissue that is being physically 
threatened and make the organism learn from its experience about how to behaviorally 
deal with such stimuli.  The neurophysiological mechanisms subserving the affective 
component of sensory pains are complex and less well-understood relative to our 
knowledge of the nociceptive systems and are mostly comprised by partially overlapping 
but nevertheless distinct brain structures such as the midbrain and limbic system 
structures, basal ganglia, as well as parts of insular, prefrontal, and cingulate cortices.  
Most of these are phylogenetically older and thought to underlie emotions and 
motivation (behavior, motor output) as well as certain forms of learning.  Thus, (normal)6 
sensory pains have always an affective-motivational component in addition to a sensory-
discriminative component.  The authors of the IASP definition have decided to use the 
word ‘unpleasant’ to denote this negative affective character that immediately modifies 
or attaches to the pain’s sensory component and makes the pain experience directly 
relevant to motivation and moral considerations.   
 
Emotional.  It is an open question what the word ‘emotional’ contributes to the IASP 
definition beyond the word ‘unpleasant’ does.  Indeed, there is a long explanatory Note 
added to the IASP definition that reads “[pain] is unquestionably a sensation in a part or 
parts of the body, but it is also always unpleasant and therefore also an emotional 
experience” (IASP, 1979/2011), which makes it sound like a pain experience is an 
emotional experience in virtue of being unpleasant and nothing else.  This interpretation 
would not be incorrect but may be misleading.  Arguably, there is a minimal sense in 
which any experience with an immediate negative or positive affect (hedonic valence) 
attached — maybe with some noticeable intensity — is an emotional experience, and 
                                                 
5 See Melzack and Casey (1968) for the classic statement of the different components of pain.  They 
included a cognitive-behavioral component in addition to sensory-discriminative and affective-motivational 
components.  The prevalence and clinical importance of secondary affect (see below) may justify the 
addition of this component to the overall characterization of pain — see below for more discussion. 
6 This qualification is necessary in light of certain pain syndromes such pain asymbolia as well as pains 
experienced after certain brain lesions and surgical procedures such as prefrontal lobotomies and 
cingulatomies, where patients sincerely report pains but do not seem to find their pains bothersome, 
unpleasant, or bad.  Some of these cases seem to involve sensory pains with nociceptive activity with 
diminished or completely absent affective-motivational component (Berthier et al 1988, Price 2000).  Note 
that the IASP definition excludes pains that are not unpleasant.   
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thus an emotion. But most pains involve emotion in a more robust sense than this.  
Consider, for example, that you discover through a painful tactile encounter a developing 
lipoma under your arm.  Your lymph cancer had been in remission for three years.  The 
pain experience you felt upon pressing on the bump under your skin had an immediate 
negative affect — it hurt. But this experience was clearly much more ‘painful’ than the 
momentary physical hurt you felt: it also involved a sudden, deeper, sickening dread that 
overcame you for fear of the cancer coming back.  Several negative emotions are caused 
here: fear, anxiety, panic, and more.  The first brief hurt is not properly described as 
suffering.  In the clinical literature, the former brief hurt or unpleasantness is sometimes 
called the ‘primary affect’ (or, moment-to-moment affect) and the latter set of emotions 
‘secondary affect’ (Fields 1999, Price 2000).  This distinction is most at home in cases of 
recurrent and persistent pains.  Most often it is the secondary affect that grounds the 
suffering involved in chronic cases and is the major cause of decline in life-quality and 
well-being and generates most of the psychological, social and economic stigmas 
associated with chronic pain.  In our example, the secondary affect is due to further 
processing of the information contained in the brief tactile/nociceptive encounter in light 
of your beliefs, expectations, values, desires, etc.  The huge negative affective/emotional 
impact of this experience is due to what the sensory pain may mean to you given your 
concerns and doxastic background.  Secondary affect involves heavier cognitive 
processing and is thus variable depending on various degrees of individual and contextual 
parameters.  Thus, in light of most pains’ having a secondary affect to varying degrees 
and complexities, pain may be said to be an emotional experience in a more robust sense, 
which is probably what the authors of the IASP definition had in mind. 
 There is another way to carve the distinction between these two sorts of affect.  
We may call the primary affect that directly attaches to pain sensations ‘sensory affect’ as 
this affect is an immediate sensory-quality-dependent modification of a sensation which 
has a more direct psychophysical connection to the sensory intensity of pain.  We may 
call the secondary affect ‘cognitive affect’ as it seems to be a function of not sensory 
quality per se but of more abstractly characterized information extracted and further 
processed by cognitive and conative mechanisms downstream of sensation.  An 
advantage of characterizing the distinction in these terms is that we can generalize it 
beyond pain.  All sorts of sensory modalities produce experiences with primary affect 
(positive as well as negative), ‘sensory affect’ may thus be applied to sensation-
dependent immediate hedonic valence (positive or negative) — e.g., the pleasant taste of 
chocolate, smell of rose, etc.  Similarly, all sorts of experiences (sensory or otherwise) 
generate secondary affect due to what information they convey in light of what concerns 
and background knowledge the agents have — e.g., anxiety of driving on the fast lane, 
feeling the sudden strong gust while gybing, etc.  ‘Cognitive affect’ may usefully cover 
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such episodes — whether negative or positive.7  Indeed, most salient members of 
cognitive affect are standard emotions, such as grief, anger, fear, joy, etc.  Note that 
cognitive affect is affect due to cognitive processing and is so designated because of its 
relative independence of modality specific sensory qualities, and not because it lacks 
feelings or phenomenology — indeed many experiences with cognitive affect may be 




Unlike in the case of pain, there is no accepted definition of pleasure.  Indeed, as far as I 
know, there isn’t even an attempt to offer a definition in the field.  Part of the reason for 
this is the polysemy of the word ‘pleasure’ in ordinary language.  We have already 
distinguished above between pleasure experiences and their sources or objects, and 
pointed out that it is the experience (as a mental event or episode) that we’ll have in 
mind when discussing pleasure here.  Beyond this, the distinction we introduced between 
primary and secondary affect should shed some light on a further crucial distinction 
among pleasures.  We called the affective-motivational component of pain that 
immediately attaches to the pain sensation in an intensity and quality dependent way, 
‘primary affect,’ and attempted to generalize the notion to all sensory experiences with 
positive or negative hedonic valence by calling it ‘sensory affect.’  We can now define 
sensory pleasure simply as a pleasant sensation:  
 
Sensory pleasure = sensation + positive affect 
(or, slightly more precisely: positively valenced modality dependent 
sensory experience)8 
 
                                                 
7 Philosophers sometimes use the term ‘propositional’ (especially in designating propositional pleasures) for 
this sort of affect.  See Feldman (1992) among others.  The ‘cognitive/conative’ processes involved need not 
be very complicated or volitional — all that is required is that the information extracted or obtained is 
subjected to one’s background knowledge and concerns (this could be fast and relatively automatic in many 
or most cases). 
8 Remember that we are using ‘sensation’ in a restricted sense referring only to the immediate output of 
sensory mechanisms.  Kent Berridge has this sort of sensory pleasure in mind when he writes: “Sweetness 
tastes nice. The pleasantness of a sweet taste is a gloss on the mere sensation, added by our brains to the 
sensory quality of sweetness” (2004a: 243 — see also Frijda 2001). Berridge talks about the sensory quality 
of sweetness, presumably meaning the sensation of sweetness.  The term ‘sweetness’ may denote 
whatever constellation of physical features of molecules that gives rise to the characteristic sensation upon 
tasting sweet substances.  Or it may denote the particular sensory quality (qualia) of one’s experience upon 
tasting such a substance.  The former is an objective, physical feature of substances (stimuli).  The latter is a 
subjective sensory quality — a phenomenological constituent of one’s sensory experience.  Psychophysics is 
precisely that discipline that investigates the systematic relationships between these two kinds of 
occurrences when generalized to all modalities. 
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Examples would include sensory experiences that we find pleasant solely due to how they 
feel in terms of sensory qualities and their intensities such as the various taste or smell 
experiences of tasty food items.9  Note that sensory pleasures would be an instance of 
the more general schema for sensory affect:  
 
Sensory affect = sensation + primary affect  (positive or negative) 
 
It turns out that pain is unique in having its own proprietary sensory specialization about 
noxious stimuli.  Sensory pleasures, by contrast, are experiences that are the immediate 
result of sensory mechanisms involved in all the other sensory modalities — when the 
affective-motivational mechanisms tag them positively as pleasant.  The proper class to 
oppose sensory pleasures is thus, not pain, but the class of sensory displeasures (for 
example, the sensory experiences upon smelling awful smells, tasting bitter substances, 
hearing sudden loud sounds, etc. — in brief, unpleasant sensations): 
 
Sensory displeasure = sensation + primary negative affect 
(or, slightly more precisely: negatively valenced modality 
dependent sensory experience) 
 
Pain is thus a subspecies of sensory displeasures with its own proprietary (nociceptive) 
sensory (sub)modality.  In this respect, sensory pains and pleasures are quite different: 
the latter don’t have any sensory system or modality proprietary to itself.10   
 Finally, we have pleasures instantiating positive cognitive affect as described 
above.  These would be non-sensory experiences with positive affect due to their amodal 
informational content.  Suppose I am a strawberry farmer, eagerly hoping to find my 
strawberries ready to be picked relatively early in the spring.  I am not hungry or thirsty.  I 
am in fact tired of eating strawberries, don’t like them very much anymore.  I bite the 
strawberry.  I am very pleased by how it tastes.  But this is not because I find the taste 
intrinsically pleasant, rather it is because the taste indicates that my strawberries are 
ready to be picked and sold — I am pleased that I will have a good return on the market.  
Although the experience is pleasant, the affect isn’t solely due to the intrinsic sensory 
                                                 
9 In ordinary speech, sometimes the terms ‘physical’ or ‘sensual pleasure’ are also used to denote sensory 
pleasures as characterized here. 
10 Notwithstanding the recent discovery of slow-conducting unmyelinated fibres “coding for pleasant 
touch” (Löken et al. 2009) — there are no fibres that “code” for mere pleasantness as an objective stimulus 
feature of the detected peripheral event.  See Fulkerson (2016) for a critical discussion.  The case of sexual 
orgasm as a pleasure is complicated — orgasms seem to have a sensory dependency that other sensory 
pleasures seem to lack.  I don’t think orgasms pose difficulties for the claim made in the main text, but I 
cannot pursue this matter here — see Georgiadis & Kringelbach (2012). 
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quality involved (this could even be unpleasant), but rather is a function of my 
background knowledge and preferences, previous experiences I’ve had, and the 
interpretation of current context (physical, social, economic), etc.  In a certain sense, my 
pleasure has very little to do with this taste experience I’ve just had, it is the pleasure I 
derive from learning that my strawberries are ready for harvesting early and will bring me 
more profit than expected.  We can call this sort of pleasure, non-sensory or cognitive 
pleasure.  This is the positive affect that is brought about typically as a result of cognitive 
processing of information (including sensorially supplied information) in light of one’s 
background beliefs, values, preferences, and can be phenomenologically quite real and 
intense and manifested in the form of an overwhelming feeling — but it can also be so 
fleeting that may not leave any phenomenological trace in your consciousness.11 
 
The Common Element 
 
So, what should we be talking about when we discuss pains and pleasures in the context 
of emotions?  Both sensory and non-sensory (cognitive) pains and pleasures vary in a 
common bi-valent affective dimension that we may just simply call, affect.  So, affect 
occurs as being attached to sensations and cognitions12 — we may simply say that affect 
qualitatively modifies them.  In fact, this seems to be the primary form that affect is 
manifested in.13  Morten Kringelbach and Kent Berridge sum it up well when they write 
that the basic  
 
research [in affective neuroscience] has shown that pleasure is never merely a 
sensation nor a thought, but an additional hedonic gloss, which is the pleasure 
versus displeasure affect that is actively generated by the brain and attached to its 
sensory or cognitive object. This [positive or negative] hedonic gloss of an object is 
generated by the brain in dedicated networks of hedonic hotspots and coldspots. 
(2017: 198) 
 
                                                 
11 For instance, I read in the campus newspaper that the administration has just voted to increase funding 
to the Library.  I am pleased — happy to learn that.  But I can’t introspectively detect any feeling that I can 
identify with my feeling pleasure on this occasion. 
12 I am including perception in the cognition category as it requires some cognitive/conceptual uptake 
compared to sensation.  Obviously, sensory versus cognitive affect is itself a continuum depending on how 
much cognitive uptake or information integration/extraction takes place.  Also, there may be activity-based 
pleasures involving many sensations and cognitions but that cannot be reduced to them such as playing 
competent tennis, dancing, reading a well-crafted novel, taking a walk in the woods, etc.  This is a topic for 
another occasion — see Frijda (2010). 
13 But “core affect” can also, it seems, occur on its own as in the case of generalized moods when we just 




We can summarize the general structure thus:  
 
Sensation or cognition + affect (negative or positive) 
 
It turns out that sensory pain is a little more specialized in that it has its own relatively 
specialized sensory (nociceptive) system detecting certain forms of physical disorders in 
or on the body.  
 Pain and pleasure understood as affectively modified experiences (in the broad 
sense involving sensations or cognitions or both) are composite states.  We can study 
them as such or we may focus on the affective component in a more direct manner.  In 
what follows, after briefly touching on pain, I’ll take the second option and concentrate 





When viewed this way, it is not at all surprising to see that there has been no unity in the 
history of the study of pain and pleasure.  The history of pain research, for obvious 
reasons, has tended to mix up with medical research, and especially in the last 100 or so 
years, heavily blended with the research on the somatosensory nervous system, and this 
orientation is still dominant in the study of pain today, even though there is an increasing 
recognition of the importance of the affective-motivational aspect of pain and attempts 
to study it in relation to general negative (aversive) affect.14   
 Before turning to affect, it’s important to mention a key turning point in the study 
of pain that revolutionized pain science that should be familiar to all.  Ronald Melzack and 
Patrick Wall published two papers in the 1960’s, one on the nature of cutaneous sensory 
mechanisms (1962), and one in 1965 proposing a partially speculative new theory of pain 
that came to be known as the Gate-Control Theory of pain.  Later in 1968, Melzack along 
with Ken Casey published another paper on the “sensory, motivational, and central 
control determinants” on pain.  The 1962 paper influentially argued against the specificity 
theory of nociceptive transmission, which was popular then.  The Gate-Control Theory, 
                                                 
14 The literature on the affective-motivational dimension of pain in the last 15 years or so has steadily 
grown up with an accelerated pace.  There is an increasing recognition that pain’s negative affect and 
aversive motivational character share common neural mechanisms with sensory reward, positive affect and 
motivation.  For a sampling, see Leknes & Tracey (2008), Bromberg-Martin et al. (2010), Berridge & 
Kringelbach (2013a), Borsook et al (2013), Navratilova et al. (2014, 2015), Baliki & Apkarian (2015), Namburi 
et al. (2016), Mitsi et al. (2016), Taylor et al. (2016), Porreca & Navratilova (2017), DosSantos et al. (2017), 




despite lack of details, established the existence of gating mechanisms in the spinal cord, 
and heavy top-down effects from the brain on the spinal processing of nociceptive 
information.  The 1968 paper proposed a model of pain with three different constitutive 
dimensions including, most famously, the affective-motivational dimension of pain.  
Although these works were the syntheses that depended on many pioneering works of 
others, these three papers, nevertheless, set the agenda for the subsequent pain 
research like no others in that era.  During the following decades, pain science was never 
the same: these works had a tremendous impact on both the quality and quantity of 
research on pain — their influence continues even today.15 
 
Affect (positive or negative) 
One could reasonably say that the history of scientific research on pleasure started in the 
second half of 19th Century with reward theories of learning in the context of adaptive 
behavior.  In this regard, most theories generalized their principles to cover not only 
pleasure with reward (positive affect), but also displeasure/pain with punishment 
(negative affect).  The focus was on the role pain and pleasure play in learning and 
motivation of behavior.  Early theorists such as Alexander Bain (1865), Herbert Spencer 
(1870), James Baldwin (1894) formulated their views psychologically, without any 
hesitation of using mental terms like ‘pain’, ‘pleasure’, ‘feelings of agreeableness’ and so 
on.  Indeed, Cason (1932) attributed to these thinkers what he called the “pleasure-pain 
theory of learning,” according to which, “organisms select those modes of behavior which 
are accompanied or followed by pleasure and eliminate those that are accompanied or 
followed by pain” (440).  This is a concise statement of how individual flexible behavior is 
acquired or learned, which assumes that pains and pleasures are somehow connected to 
motivation.  Thorndike’s well-known Law of Effect, in contrast, appears to be more 
behavioral rather than psychological:16  
 
Of several responses made to the same situation, those which are accompanied or 
closely followed by satisfaction to the animal will, other things being equal, be 
more firmly connected with the situation, so that, when [the situation] recurs, 
[the responses] will be more likely to recur; those which are accompanied or 
closely followed by discomfort to the animal will, other things being equal, have 
                                                 
15 See Sufka & Price (2002) for a general evaluation of the Gate-Control Theory.  Perl (2007) contains a very 
informative historical survey of pain research.  Apkarian et al (2013) and Woo et al (2017) are good sources 
for an overall evaluation of most recent brain imaging studies.   
16 It depends on how one interprets the crucial terms such as ‘satisfaction’ and ‘discomfort’ in the 
quotation.  In early formulations, Thorndike clearly had in mind psychological interpretation, but later on, in 
response to behaviorist criticisms, he dropped psychological terms in favor of merely behavioral repetition 
effects.  See Berridge (2000). 
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their connections with that situation weakened, so that, when it recurs, they will 
be less likely to occur. The greater the satisfaction or discomfort, the greater the 
strengthening or weakening of the bond. (Thorndike 1911: 244)  
 
 Behaviorists such as Clark Hull (1943, 1952) and B. F. Skinner (1938) in developing 
their principles of learning along similar lines tended to avoid the use of psychological 
words.  Instead, they referred to objective stimuli by allegedly non-psychological words 
like ‘reinforcers’ or ‘punishers’ that function in establishing probabilities of certain types 
of behavior in response to stimulus conditions in the light of organism’s conditioning 
history.   
 One of the major contributors to behaviorism’s demise was its inability to explain 
satisfactorily how reinforcers reinforced, or how punishers punished, without introducing 
sufficiently rich set of internal motivating states.  Hull thought that the reduction or 
increment in drive states produced by biological needs provides the mechanism for the 
changes in the rates of behavioral responses.  Roughly, what is needed is a mechanism 
that will somehow track the effects of an animal’s response to stimuli such that if they 
fulfill a certain criterion it will set in motion whatever further mechanism does the 
strengthening or weakening of this response type next time similar stimuli are 
encountered.  What is needed, in other words, is a description of this criterion 
independent of the downstream strengthening or weakening effects on the response.  
The drive reduction theories such as Hull’s take this criterion to be either the increase or 
reduction in biological needs or the reduction or increase in the drive states created by 
such needs.  If among the consequences of the animal’s behavior are the fulfillment of 
the animal’s need or the reduction in the drive signal then the stimulus that prompted 
the behavioral response is a reward and therefore a reinforcer.  If the response doesn’t 
have need-fulfilling or drive-reducing consequences, then the stimulus isn’t a reward and 
therefore shouldn’t (positively) reinforce the response (it could even be a punisher).  
Drive reduction by satisfying biological needs is thus the proposed independent 
mechanism of how rewards reward (or, reinforcers reinforce) — and punishers punish in 
case there is increase in drive. 
 Drive reduction theories have proven to be empirically false: there have been 
many demonstrations that merely satisfying the biological nutrient needs, thus 
presumably reducing the drive, by for example intravenous or intragastric feeding, don’t 
stop motivated eating or drinking behavior (Miller & Kessen 1952, Nicolaidis & Rowland 
1976, Myers et al 1998, among others).  The electrical brain stimulation experiments 
conducted by James Olds and Peter Milner and many others in the 50’s and 60’s (Olds & 
Milner 1954, Olds 1977) also decisively showed that animals can be motivated to act and 
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taught to act in ways which have nothing to do with natural drive reduction by need 
satisfaction.  Drive reduction is neither necessary nor sufficient for reinforcement. 
 The failure of drive theories encouraged the development of incentive theories of 
motivation and learning (e.g., Pfaffman 1960, Young 1966, Bolles 1972, Bindra 1978, 
Dickinson 1985, Dickinson & Balleine 1994, Toates 1994, Panksepp 1998, Berridge & 
Robinson 1998, Berridge 2004b).  The basic tenet of these theories is that organisms 
respond to stimuli not because they are reinforced to do so according to a strict 
behaviorist reading of the Law of Effect, but because their responses are pieces of 
behavior emitted due to the incentive values of the environmental cues (conditioned 
stimuli — CS) as well as the expected hedonic values of rewards they predict 
(unconditioned stimuli — UC), which usually involves experiential encounter with the 
reward during consummatory activity.  It is possible to interpret these theories as a way 
of returning to the pleasure-pain theory of learning.  Incentive theories interpret 
rewarding and punishing qualities of stimuli psychologically as their capacity to impact 
agents hedonically or affectively.  As we move around and behave in the world, we 
acquire expectancies about what stimuli and what behavioral responses will result in 
experiences with hedonic/affective value (with positive or negative valence).  Experienced 
hedonic value is what seems to determine the incentive value for those objects, events, 
conditions in the world that, when interacted with in the right way, tend to bring about 
the affectively (hedonically) valued experiences.  Learning, then, consists in learning when 
to attribute incentive value to what worldly conditions.   
 Historically, this function of affect has taken to imply motivation.  Learned hedonic 
expectancies have been thought to necessarily bring along with them motivation.  
Indeed, the idea that hedonic value (positive or negative affect) is inherently motivating 
seems quite intuitive: it sounds like a truism when it is said that all organisms capable of 
experiencing affect tend to pursue experiences with positive affect and shun those with 
negative affect.  It was this “truism” that led to the view that dopamine is the 
neurotransmitter of pleasure.  Olds and Milner’s 1954 brain stimulation experiments on 
rats showed that rats can be made to eagerly and repeatedly press a lever upon delivery 
of tiny electrical currents in certain areas in their hypothalamus and septum at the 
expense of food, water, sex, and other naturally rewarding stimuli.  Robert Heath (1963) 
and others later ran similar experiments on humans who reported various desires and 
urges and tended to similarly self-stimulate continuously.  Olds (1956) described the brain 
sites as “pleasure centers” and the term quickly got stuck with the popular imagination 
for a while.  Roy Wise (1980) along with others identified many stimulation sites as 
dopaminergic and commented: “I wonder if OIds' notion [pleasure center], though 
admittedly simplistic, does not merit a closer look since it now seems clear that blockade 
of the dopamine synapse can uniquely block the rewarding impact as objectively 
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defined… and since direct activation of this synapse is rewarding in its own right” (1980: 
94).  Pretty much all the actual evidence strongly pointed to motivation (‘wanting’, 
pursuing, acting) and the dopamine’s role in it, and yet the brain centers and the role of 
dopamine got labeled as hedonic (‘liking’, pleasure) mainly because of the natural dual 
assumptions that pleasure inherently motivates and that strong motivation is a direct 
measure of hedonic impact.  
 
Current Evidence (about positive affect) 
 
Recent research in affective neuroscience seems to show that these assumptions may not 
be correct if interpreted as expressing more than mere causal connections.  Since the 
early 1990’s, there has been growing evidence that the pleasure/liking circuitry (for 
merely hedonic phenomena) in the brain is connected to but distinct from the circuitry 
subserving wanting/desiring (motivation).  There is now a growing consensus that the 
mesocorticolimbic dopaminergic system, which was once thought to directly underlie 
pleasure, is not directly responsible for ‘liking’ whatever the primary sensations the 
animal may be undergoing.17  (This system projects from a region in the midbrain to the 
nucleus accumbens, NA, and some neighboring areas.)  Rather, the circuitry that seems 
essential for liking consists of groups of “hotspots” that are functionally connected to 
each other and are to be found in the rostrodorsal quadrant of the medial shell of NAc 
and the posterior part of ventral pallidum (VP) as well as in the parabrachial nucleus 
(Pecina et al 2006; Smith & Berridge 2007).  The NA hotspots receive major input from 
the infralimbic cortex, which itself interacts heavily with orbitofrontal, prelimbic and 
anterior cingulate cortices.  NA has strong projections to VP (as well as parts of 
amygdala). VP hotspots project to the paraventricular nucleus of the thalamus that in 
turn have connections to the infralimbic cortex and other frontal areas, thus closing the 
loop.  This circuitry interacts with the dopamine systems but also uses different 
neuromodulators such as enkephalin and anandamide, as well as glutamate and GABA 
(intersystems) (Castro & Berridge 2014a,b).  There are also cold spots in NA and VP.  The 
terms ‘hot spot’ and ‘cold spot’ were used by Pecina and Berridge (2005) to denote tiny 
anatomical regions where microinjections of opioids significantly increase or decrease 
                                                 
17 Kent Berridge and his colleagues have been most vocal about this evidence: see Berridge 1996, 1999, 
2006; Berridge & Robinson 1998, 2003; Pecina et al. 2006; Berridge & Kringelbach 2011, 2015.  The 
collection edited by Berridge and Kringelbach (2010) contains very useful chapters reflecting the state of 
the art.  See also Salamone et al. (1997, 2002), Ikemoto & Panksepp (1996, 1999), among others.  Berridge 
and his colleagues distinguish liking/wanting, which they take to be consciously experienced, from core 
‘liking’/’wanting’ (with quotes) that are not necessarily conscious.  I’ll ignore this for convenience and use 
the words without quotations and leave open their status as conscious or not.  Needless to say, conscious 
liking/disliking will be underlain by additional neural structures and mechanisms, especially the 
orbitofrontal and insular cortices. 
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hedonic reactions.  It is thought that these functionally connected hubs of hotspots act in 
unison to stamp a sensation as pleasant in that if any hub in the circuitry defects or issues 
a veto, the sensation that is being processed is denied the ‘pleasant’ stamp or no increase 
in hedonic impact occurs (Berridge & Kringelbach 2013b). 
 Most of the evidence for the separability of these two systems comes from 
various experiments that show that the liking system can be modulated (enhanced or 
inhibited) independently of the wanting system, and vice versa (Berridge 1999; Berridge 
& Kringelbach 2011). For instance, you see motorically capable dopamine-depleted rats 
starving themselves to death in the presence of readily available food — they are not 
motivated to eat in the sense that they seem to lack a desire for food.  But when these 
rats are force-fed, they exhibit orofacial movements clearly indicative of them liking the 
taste (Berridge & Robinson 1998).  There are also experiments where you can increase or 
decrease liking without a corresponding change in wanting, or you can make rats work 
hard to get and consume food or sucrose solution without them liking their taste (Pecina 
et al. 2006).  Similar disassociations seem to exist in humans — indeed addiction is taken 
to be the overreaction of an overly sensitized ‘wanting’ (dopamine) system to contextual 
cues surrounding drug use without corresponding proportional hedonic impact (Robinson 
& Berridge 1993; Robinson & Berridge 2008).   
 If affect (hedonic valence) and motivation are only causally connected and can be 
dissociated, then the question arises as to what the function of sensory affect is — what 
is the functional signature of hedonic valence within the mental economy of the 
liking/wanting/acting agent?  The function of conative states like wanting or desiring 
(motivation) is relatively straightforward: move the agent in a way that will tend to bring 
about the worldly content of these states (when combined with other information about 
the perceptual environment and past experience, etc.).  For instance, if I now want to 
have a beer to quench my thirst, ceteris paribus, I will behave, shortly after, in a way that 
will bring about what I want (the propositional content — that I drink beer).  When 





One natural proposal is that hedonic valence is a “teaching signal” of sorts:18 it tells the 
agent to ‘want,’ or form a ‘desire’ to bring about, what is thus valenced — this involves, 
                                                 
18 I am using this expression not to refer to the phasic dopamine signals that are hypothesized to code 
prediction errors in expected reward.  The role of phasic dopamine signals in midbrain structures (VTA, SN) 
has been controversial but they look a lot like the teaching/learning signals postulated by many 
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and for most animals, exhausts learning when and how to perform those sequences of 
actions similar to those that have actually lead to the obtaining of the valenced 
experience.  Liking helps attribute incentive salience to environmental stimuli and sustain 
it (Berridge 1996, Dickinson & Balleine 2010).  The sustaining bit is important.  A learning-
capable agent that acts out of an existing want or desire (learned, acquired, or otherwise) 
needs to somehow track the consequences of its behavior, that is, whether its actions 
result (or have resulted) in the satisfaction or frustration of its ‘desires’ — generating 
more 'likes' or 'dislikes.'  Plausibly, this is the other side of the same coin — of learning 
what desires to form on the basis of experienced valence.  So, experienced valence is also 
a signal for desire satisfaction or frustration (cf. Schroeder 2004).  Thus, although the 
mechanisms for affect and motivation are separate, they causally interact.  We quite 
generally want what we like, and, more often than not, we like what we want.  
 Further research on the function of affect is likely to reveal in the future that there 




The discovery of dissociable underlying mechanisms has obvious important implications 
for a better understanding of affective disorders such as depression, clinical anxiety, and 
bipolar disorders as well as addiction and obsessive-compulsive behavior.  For example, 
the well-received incentive sensitization theory of addiction (Robinson & Berridge 1993, 
2008) directly came out of hypotheses about the separability of affect from motivation — 
one way to characterize addiction is as a big increase in motivation to seek and consume 
substances that is vastly disproportionate to the increasingly diminishing affective payoff.  
The advances in basic affective neuroscience are poised to deliver surprising results about 
the causes of various emotional and affective disorders, which promises not only to 
greatly facilitate proper, faster, and more detailed diagnosis but also to offer huge 
potential for developing treatment options.  There is increasing research on the extensive 
mechanisms shared by the brain’s default-mode network and the affective circuitry, both 
of which are connected, unsurprisingly, to pervasive affective disorders such as 
depression and anhedonia in general.  There is evidence that optimal metastability in the 
brain’s large-scale dynamical oscillation plays a role in subjective affective wellbeing. 
(Kringelbach & Berridge 2017).19 
                                                 
reinforcement learning algorithms (see, e.g., Schultz 1997, 2016 for a defense; see Berridge 2012, and 
Berridge & O’Doherty 2014 for general critical assessment). 
19 There are historical precedents to this sort of approach to affective wellbeing.  Sigmund Freud himself 
noted that his own ‘Pleasure Principle’ is substantially the same as Gustav Fechner’s ‘Principle of Constancy’ 
(1983): “In so far as conscious impulses always have some relation to pleasure or unpleasure, pleasure and 






Above, we had a schema about the general structure of pains and pleasures: 
 
[sensation or cognition or both] + affect20 
 
The question to ask is:  
 
(Q)  Does every instance of this schema yield an emotion? 
 
In the absence of clear and uncontroversial criteria about what qualifies as an emotion, it 
is hard to answer this question.  If I rely on my pre-theoretical intuitions, I am inclined to 
answer it in the negative.  But we all know that when it comes to emotions, people’s 
intuitions (pre-theoretical or otherwise) are all over the place.  Perhaps we can simply 
stipulate that any sensory affect is an elementary emotion.  This would be fine but it shifts 
the main research question in emotion theory: what, then, makes a mental episode into a 
non-elementary emotion?  If we can set the sensory case aside in this way by designating 
them as elementary, perhaps we can identify all cognitive affect with emotions?  This 
suggestion is probably better — as all emotions are known to involve some cognitive 
uptake about what is going on in the environment of their emoters, which is usually not a 
modality specific affair and involves cognitive appraisals.  But what about very simple 
forms of cognitive affect?  For example, I’ve just learned there is less car theft in my 
neighbourhood this year than last year — I am certainly pleased that this is so.  Have I 
undergone an emotion?  Saying yes would seem to stretch the meaning of ‘emotion’.  The 
best we can justifiably say, it seems to me, is that some pains and pleasures are emotions, 
some not — and leave it at that for present purposes. 
                                                 
instability. . .  According to this hypothesis, every psycho-physical motion rising above the threshold of 
consciousness is attended by pleasure in proportion as, beyond a certain limit, it approximates to complete 
stability, and as attended by unpleasure in proportion as, beyond a certain limit, it deviates from complete 
stability; while between the two limits, which may be described as qualitative thresholds of pleasure and 
unpleasure, there is a certain margin of … indifference” (quoted in Freud 1920/1961: 2).  It would be 
interesting to sort out the similarities and differences between this tradition and the emotion psychologists 
(e.g., Russell 2003, 2009) who promote the notion of a “core affect” as the foundation out of which 
emotions are constructed. 
20 Positive or negative affect.  It is plausible that affect is a dimension of all mental events even when they 
seem affectively neutral.  One way of putting the point is to say that there are no affectless mental events 
but there are affectively neutral ones.  It makes sense to posit affect in this sense as always present, and 
“commenting” or glossing on all mental episodes with intentional content that contribute to learning, 
decision making and action.  It should be obvious why this is particularly crucial in sensing or perceiving our 
environment and acting in it quickly and efficiently. 
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 The key point not to lose sight of is that the core brain mechanisms that generate 
negative or positive affect as attached to mental processes and the mechanisms 
connecting affect to learning, decision-making, motivation, and action, are the core 
building blocks of all emotions.  We need to investigate what further elaboration of the 
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